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Tort as a Substitute for Revenge
Scott Hershovitz*

I. Introduction
In 1872, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided a case called Alcorn v Mitchell.1 It was
not the ﬁrst litigation between the parties. Some years earlier, Alcorn had sued
Mitchell for trespass.2 That suit did not go well, and at the close of the trial, just
after the court adjourned, Alcorn spit in Mitchell’s face.3 Mitchell then turned the
tables and sued Alcorn for battery. He won a judgment for $1,000, which was a lot of
money back then—depending on how you think about the change in value of money
over time, the present day equivalent would range from just about $20,000 to a bit
more than $250,000.4 Alcorn appealed. The question put to the Illinois Supreme Court
was whether he had “been made to pay too dearly for [his] indulgence.”5
The court did not think so. Toward the end of its opinion, it noted that Alcorn was a
“man of wealth.” 6 But it placed more emphasis on what he did than on who he was. “It
is customary,” the court observed, “to instruct juries that they may give vindictive
damages where there are circumstances of malice, willfulness, wantonness, outrage
* Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Thanks to Andrew
Gold, John Goldberg, Don Herzog, Bill Miller, John Oberdiek, and the participants in the Legal Theory
Workshop at the American University Washington College of Law for helpful comments and conversations.
1

Alcorn v Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872).
The only published opinion in the litigation between Alcorn and Mitchell is the 1872 Illinois Supreme Court
opinion from the second suit. It refers to the parties as plaintiff and defendant, without saying who was who.
However, the docket in that case (available in the Illinois State Archives) makes clear that Alcorn was the plaintiff
in the ﬁrst suit and Mitchell the plaintiff in the second. See Pleas and Proceedings in the Circuit Court, Alcorn v
Mitchell, 65 Ill. 553 (1872) (Supreme Court Docket No. 88, Agenda No. 15) (herinafter “Pleas and Proceedings”).
3
The opinion in the later case describes Alcorn as an “exasperated suitor.” Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554.
4
Simply updating for inﬂation suggests that the equivalent award today would be about $19,400. But we
might get a better read on the magnitude of the award by gauging its relationship to per-capita gross domestic
product (GDP), which was $195.64 in 1872. Since per-capita GDP in 2012 was $49,927.74, a similarly sized
award today would be roughly $255,000. I obtained both measures from calculators at <http://www.
measuringworth.com> accessed October 23, 2013.
5
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554. Alcorn also challenged the jury instructions, but the court did not address them.
6
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554.
2
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and indignity attending the wrong complained of. The act in question was wholly
made up of such qualities. It was one of pure malignity, done for the mere purpose of
insult and indignity.”7 Alcorn, the court said, gratiﬁed “his malignant feelings in [a]
despicable mode.”8 And worse than that, he did so in “the temple of justice . . . in the
very presence of its ministers.”9
So it seems fair to say that the court did not think much of Alcorn’s spit. But why
damages, and why such a substantial sum? There is no hint that Mitchell suffered an
injury beyond the indignity, no hint that he suffered an injury that money might
repair. Yet, the court still saw a purpose to the payment: “The act in question was one
of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force, and the law, as far
as it may, should afford substantial protection against such outrages, in the way of
liberal damages, that the public tranquility may be preserved by saving the necessity
of resort to personal violence as the only means of redress.”10 In other words, Alcorn
had to pay so that Mitchell would not have to strike back. The tort suit was to
substitute for the revenge the court worried Mitchell might take absent a civil means
of redress.
The idea that tort suits are a substitute for revenge is still with us today.11 But it is not
clear how the substitution is supposed to work. One possibility is that tort suits are a
substitute for revenge simply because some people who would seek revenge are willing
to forego it if they can obtain money damages in a tort suit instead. On this picture, tort
damages are a payoff to prevent private violence. This is a rather thin sense of
substitution, as it does not presuppose any connection between tort and revenge beyond
the preferences of potential plaintiffs. In this sense, a scheme of taxpayer-funded trips to
Tahiti might substitute for revenge, if victims would forego violence in favor of it.
There is a hint of the payoff picture in Alcorn, when the court says that liberal
damages are warranted so that the “the public tranquility may be preserved.”12 But
I suspect that the court meant to say more by way of justifying the award. After all, the
payoff picture is consistent with a dim view of Mitchell and his pursuit of damages.
A better man, the court might have thought, would let the slight slide and not hold the
court hostage to the threat of retaliation. But there is no hint in the opinion that the
court regrets the need to purchase public tranquility at the cost of liberal damages. Quite
the opposite. The court seems pleased to approve the judgment, explaining that “[s]o
long as damages are allowable in any civil case by way of punishment or for the sake of
example, the present, of all cases, would seem to be a most ﬁt one for the award.”13
The talk of punishment here suggests another way we might think of the substitution. Today, we would call the damages that Alcorn was ordered to pay “punitive.” But
though the court clearly saw the damages as a form of punishment, it labeled them

7

8
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554.
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554.
10
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554.
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554.
11
See Mathias v Accord Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“[A]n an
age-old purpose of the law of torts is to provide a substitute for violent retaliation against wrongful injury.”).
12
13
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554.
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 553.
9
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“vindictive,” not “punitive.” Formally, there is no difference. In most jurisdictions,
“punitive” and “vindictive” are used interchangeably to denote extra-compensatory
damages awarded for willful or wanton misconduct. But “vindictive” is a revealing
label, as it suggests that an award of such damages is responsive to the attitude
associated with revenge. And it is a short step from thinking of the damages as
vindictive to regarding them as a kind of revenge inﬂicted through a tort suit. On
this picture, the substitution is not so much tort for revenge, as it is a bloodless revenge
for a bloody one.
This thought can be developed in different ways. One version carves off punitive
damages from the rest of tort, holding that revenge comes into play only when
plaintiffs are permitted to seek extra-compensatory damages.14 Another takes the
label “vindictive” to make manifest as to punitive damages what is true of all tort
damages. After all, punitive damages are not the only damages that are painful to pay.
This has led some to suggest that a tort suit provides a plaintiff an opportunity to take
revenge by inﬂicting harm on the person who harmed her, even when only compensatory damages are on offer. And that suggestion is sometimes buttressed by the
observation that compensatory damages are not nearly so tied to the extent of the
plaintiff ’s injury as the name might suggest. By operation of several different doctrines, they often run beyond or fall short of the plaintiff ’s losses, making it hard, some
say, to take seriously tort’s talk about making plaintiffs whole.15
I do not doubt that tort can serve as an outlet for vindictive motives, and I think that
true even when punitive damages are not in play. But it is a mistake to regard tort
damages as a kind of revenge. Tort works rather differently, and not just because it is
civil rather than violent. We will see some of the differences later on. For now, I want
to continue to catalog ways in which tort might substitute for revenge. We started with
the thought that tort might be a way of paying off plaintiffs, so that they refrain from
revenge. Then, we considered the possibility that a tort suit (especially, but perhaps not
only, a successful one) just is a kind of revenge. The last possibility I want to put on the
table is that tort suits are a substitute for revenge because they can be used for the same
purposes.
This is obviously true, in at least one respect. Both tort and revenge can be used to
deter. You would think twice if the person you spit on might spit back. And you would
also think twice if you might be forced to pay $20,000 for the privilege.16 When the
Alcorn court said that it was appropriate to award damages “for the sake of example,”
deterrence is surely what it had in mind. Of course, there is nothing distinctive about
this relationship between tort and revenge. Regulation is a tool for deterrence, and
criminal prohibition is too. As means of deterrence, each has its costs and beneﬁts.
But though a pairwise comparison between tort and revenge might make tort seem
See Anthony J. Sebok, “Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory,” 92 Iowa. L. Rev. 957 (2007).
See Emily Sherwin, “Compensation and Revenge,” 40 San Diego L. Rev. 1387 (2003).
16
The standard idiom here is a bit misleading: damages do not purchase a privilege, not even in retrospect,
as paying damages does not legitimize the conduct that led to them.
14
15
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attractive, it is far less certain that tort holds up well against the others, at least for
much of the conduct that can underwrite a tort suit. It seems doubtful, for example,
that the best way to deter medical malpractice, or risky driving for that matter, is
through a system of private tort suits. So if we have deterrence in mind, we might end
up thinking that tort is a substitute for revenge, but far from the best available.
Deterrence, however, may not be the only purpose to which both tort and revenge
could be put. Another possibility is that they can both be used to do corrective justice.
This will not seem an odd thought as to tort, as philosophers have long argued that tort
suits enforce moral duties of repair.17 But it will strike many as an odd thought as to
revenge, which we are often told has little to do with justice.18 Of course, that is a
distinctly modern attitude. Francis Bacon pronounced revenge “a kind of wild justice,”19 even as he warned against it. And for those who followed the law of the talion,
getting justice meant getting even, often through violent retaliation.
I think that Bacon and adherents of the talion had it right: revenge is a tool for doing
corrective justice. And tort is a substitute for revenge because it is too. Of course, the
thought that tort is a tool for doing corrective justice is not novel. But it is often
misunderstood, and reﬂecting on revenge can help us see why. My aim in this chapter
is to think through what Mitchell might have gotten from revenge and what tort
offered him in its place. But before we do that, it will help to think a bit about
corrective justice.

II. Corrective Justice
Contemporary thinking about corrective justice is dominated by a picture that we owe
to Aristotle. Aristotle imagined two parties in an initial position of equality, represented by a line divided into equal segments. When one party disturbs that equality,
lengthening her own segment and shortening the other’s, corrective justice demands
that we restore the equality, taking from the party with the lengthened segment just
what is necessary to restore the shortened one.20
On this way of thinking, corrective justice is all about allocation. Here is how John
Gardner explains it:

17

The classic statements of the corrective justice take on tort law are: Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
18
See Gabriel Seltzer Mendlow, “Is Tort Law a Form of Institutionalized Revenge,” 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 129
(2011) (“Most would agree that institutions of revenge have no place in a just society . . . ”); See also Robert
Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), 366–8 (distinguishing revenge
from retribution and suggesting that the latter has a connection to justice that the former does not).
19
Francis Bacon, “Of Revenge,” in Brian Vickers (ed.), Francis Bacon: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 347.
20
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. V, Roger Crisp (ed. & trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 88.
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Something has shifted between . . . two parties. The question of corrective justice is not the
question of whether and to what extent and in what form and on what ground it should
now be allocated among them full stop, but the question of whether and to what extent and
in what form and on what ground it should now be allocated back from one party to the
other, reversing a transaction that took place between them.21

The Aristotelian picture ﬁts some forms of wrongdoing well. If Alcorn had stolen
Mitchell’s horse, corrective justice might demand that he give it back, reversing the
wrongful transaction.
But Alcorn did not steal from Mitchell. He spit on him. To be sure, something
shifted between them. But it hardly seems that the question of corrective justice in this
case could be about the allocation of Alcorn’s spit. After all, the problem here is not
that Mitchell possesses something to which he has no right; it is that he was subjected
to treatment that he had a right to be free from. And there is no way to reverse that
transaction. This is not because we cannot force the spit back on Alcorn. Perhaps we
could. But even if we did, that would not change the fact that Mitchell was spit upon.
Of course, we could say much the same when Alcorn steals Mitchell’s horse. Mitchell
had a right to his horse, which Alcorn infringed when he stole it. Corrective justice
might well demand that Alcorn return the horse, but there is no changing the fact that
Mitchell stole it. And we might wonder whether corrective justice requires that we do
anything about that. After all, returning the horse is just what we would expect Alcorn to
do had he found it, so it hardly seems an adequate response to the fact that he stole it.
Now one possibility is that corrective justice demands only that Alcorn return the
horse, leaving other moral principles to determine whether a further response to his
wrongdoing is warranted. This is Gardner’s view. He says that norms of justice are
“norms for tackling allocative moral questions, questions about who is to get how
much of what.”22 Within that domain, norms of corrective justice address questions
about allocating something back from one person to another, once it has shifted as the
result of wrongdoing.23 But that is all corrective justice does. If there is more to be done
in response to wrongdoing, it is not because corrective justice calls for it.24
I ﬁnd this conception of corrective justice much too cramped. It has the consequence
that many of the most serious wrongs do not call for corrective justice at all, as they do
not involve transfers that can be reversed through reallocation. If Alcorn had raped
Mitchell, for example, there would be no corrective justice to be done, as there would be
no horse to hand over. So too with the spit. And that is a rather startling conclusion.
Part of the problem here stems from the fact that wrongdoing does not always
generate a gain for the wrongdoer that matches the victim’s loss. Had Alcorn stolen
Mitchell’s horse, he would have gained the very thing that Mitchell lost. But Alcorn

John Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part I. The Place of Corrective Justice,” 30 Law & Philosophy 1
(2011), 9–10 (hereinafter “What is Tort Law For? Part I”).
22
Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part I” (note 21) at 6.
23
Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part I” (note 21) at 9–10.
24
Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part I” (note 21) at 47.
21
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may not have gained anything from spitting on Mitchell, and if he did gain something
(satisfaction, perhaps), it is neither the thing that Mitchell lost, nor something that he
could hand over. So the Aristotelian imagery is off: Mitchell’s segment of the line may
have been shortened, but Alcorn’s does not seem to have been lengthened. And even if
it was, we cannot rejigger the lines to get back where we started.
This sort of worry leads some to tweak the Aristotelian picture, so that corrective
justice requires restoring Mitchell’s segment of the line, even if that will leave Alcorn
with a shorter segment than he started with. The idea here is that the loss that Alcorn
inﬂicted on Mitchell is properly his to deal with, so he must restore Mitchell to his
rightful position and handle the consequences on his own.25 And there are cases in
which it looks like this might work. If Alcorn destroyed Mitchell’s horse, for example,
then requiring that he pay Mitchell its market value would seem to make the loss
Alcorn’s to deal with. Mitchell would be able to acquire more or less what he lost and,
Alcorn would be out money, not Mitchell.
But the problem here should be apparent, as it is symmetrical to the one we just
faced. Many kinds of wrongdoing do not involve losses that can be shifted to the
wrongdoer. It is not obvious, for example, that Mitchell lost anything when Alcorn spit
on him, but if he did (some measure of dignity, perhaps), it is not the sort of loss he can
transfer to Alcorn. This would be even more stark had Alcorn physically injured
Mitchell. If he had put his eye out, for example, we could transfer some of the
consequential losses (medical expenses, lost income, and the like) and make them
Alcorn’s problem, rather than Mitchell’s. But Mitchell would surely miss his sight, and
he could not pass that loss on to Alcorn.
Of course, there is a touch of this problem in the horse case too. As I said, Mitchell
might use his damages to acquire more or less what he lost. But he cannot recover just
what he lost—that horse has left the barn—and the difference might well matter. So it
turns out that, even when we tweak the Aristotelian imagery, it can serve as a picture of
corrective justice only for a narrow set of cases: those in which the victim has lost a
commodity, and just that. In all other cases, the victim must suffer at least some of her
loss herself.
The Aristotelian picture holds out a false promise.26 It makes it seem like we can get
back where we started; we just have to rejigger the line. But we can never get back
where we started. When one person wrongs another, the wrong is part of our history,
indelibly, and the challenge is to ﬁgure out how to go on, not how to go back. Of
course, everyone who writes about corrective justice appreciates this, at least to some
25
See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 58 (“But insofar as they enable a plaintiff to adapt to his or her situation, money damages are an
appropriate way of transferring the loss so that it becomes the injurer’s problem to decide how to deal with
what is properly his or her loss.”).
26
I develop this argument further in Scott Hershovitz, “Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists,” 39
Fla. St. L. Rev. 107 (2011), 100–17. John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky sound similar themes when they argue
that loss-focused conceptions of corrective justice do not make sense of tort doctrine. See John C.P. Goldberg
and Benjamin C. Zipursky, “Torts and Wrongs,” 88 Texas L. Rev. 917 (2010), 954–7.
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degree. So they douse their claims in qualiﬁers. They say that corrective justice consists
in “undoing, to the extent possible, the very injustice that has been committed,”27 or
“restoring things, at least in some measure, to where they would have been had one not
occasioned their loss.”28 And maybe we should do these things when we can. But these
qualiﬁers are a dodge. We can never restore things to just the way they were, and all
too often, we cannot restore them at all. So if that is what corrective justice demands,
we are bound to fall short in all cases, and we will not be able to do anything that
counts as corrective justice in many.
That would be depressing, if it were true. It would be nice to think that we could do
corrective justice for Mitchell, whether Alcorn steals his horse, spits on him, or
sexually assaults him. And it would be nice to think that our ability to do so does
not depend on the happenstance of Mitchell having incurred losses that we could shift
to Alcorn through a damage award. Happily, I think that we can offer Mitchell
corrective justice in all these cases. But to see how, we need to set the Aristotelian
picture aside and make a fresh start.

III. Corrective Justice Corrected
Let us turn our attention back to the actual facts of Alcorn v Mitchell. Alcorn had sued
Mitchell for trespass. The charge seems to have been that Mitchell took down Alcorn’s
fence without permission.29 Mitchell testiﬁed on his own behalf, apparently in a
manner that Alcorn found damaging. When the court adjourned, Alcorn approached
Mitchell and spit in his face.
But it was not just any spit, at least not according to Mitchell. Here is how his
complaint described the event:
[T]he plaintiff . . . avers that because he the plaintiff did and would testify the truth the
whole truth and nothing but the truth and because the same proved to be matter against . . .
Alcorn in his said suit . . . Alcorn then and there did willfully, maliciously and Devilishly
spit upon the plaintiff, and then and there for the cause and reason aforesaid squirted into
the face and eyes of the plaintiff a large quantity of ﬁlthy matter out of and from the mouth
of the defendant, consisting of saliva, mingled with divers ﬁlthy noisome and disgusting
drugs, whiskey and other kinds of nastiness then and there prepared by the defendant for
the express purpose of being by him squirted in the plaintiff ’s face as aforesaid.30

The court’s worry that Mitchell might strike back was not fanciful. His complaint
continued:

27

Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 36 (emphasis added).
Gardner, “What is Tort Law For? Part I” (note 21) at 37 (emphasis added).
29
Testimony of J.B. Gillaspie, Records from Marion County Proceedings, 3, Alcorn v Mitchell, 65 Ill. 553
(1872) (Supreme Court Docket No. 88, Agenda No. 15) (hereinafter “Testimony of J.B. Gillaspie”).
30
Pleas and Proceedings, at 4–5.
28
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[T]he people who were present demand[ed] that the plaintiff ought to have then and there
killed the defendant, which temptation the plaintiff resisted out of respect to the laws of
God and the State, and to the great displeasure and disgust of the numerous. To wit, One
hundred bystanders who were indignant that so gross an insult should pass unrevenged.31

It is hard to know how seriously to take all that, but the court took it seriously enough
to uphold signiﬁcant damages, on the ground that the act in question was highly
provocative of retaliation by force.
But our question is not whether Mitchell would have actually taken revenge had he not
been able to ﬁle a tort suit. It is what he would have gotten from revenge had he taken it.
For guidance, we can look again to the complaint, which recounts the fallout from having
let the insult pass: “[I]n consequence the plaintiff hath been greatly injured in his feelings
in his circumstances, his credit and his reputation.”32 That sounds a bit like boilerplate,
but, on these facts, it is easy to believe, and it is worth asking why.
The answer, I think, is that Alcorn’s spit sent a message. Here is how Jeffrie Murphy
explains the messages implicit in moral injury:
One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not simply that they hurt us in
some tangible or sensible way; it is because such injuries are also messages—symbolic
communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to us, “I count but you do not,”
“I can use you for my purposes,” or “I am here up high and you are there down below.”33

That last message, especially, would have been easy for Alcorn’s audience to take away.
As the court’s opinion noted, Alcorn was a wealthy man; estimates of his net worth at
trial ranged from $50,000 to $200,000 (or somewhere between $1 and $4 million,
updated for inﬂation).34 Mitchell, on the other hand, was said to be worth just
$2,000.35 So people may well have been primed to hear the message that Alcorn was
up high and Mitchell down low. Indeed, it is easy to imagine that the very point of
Alcorn’s spit was to reassert that message in the wake of the court crediting Mitchell’s
testimony rather than his own.
Messages of this sort matter. As Murphy says: “Most of us tend to care what others
(at least some others, some signiﬁcant group whose good opinion we value) think
about us—how much they think we matter. Our self-respect is social in at least this
sense, and it is simply part of the human condition that we are weak and vulnerable in
these ways.”36
31

32
Pleas and Proceedings, at 5.
Pleas and Proceedings, 5.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Forgiveness and resentment,” in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness
and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 25.
34
The estimates of Alcorn’s net worth appear in transcripts of testimony contained in Records from
Marion County Proceedings, 2, Alcorn v Mitchell, 65 Ill. 553 (1872) (Supreme Court Docket No. 88, Agenda
No. 15). Once again, I have taken rough inﬂation ﬁgures from <http://www.measuringworth.com>. If you
prefer to compare the ﬁgures to per-capita GDP, then present equivalent of Alcorn’s net worth would range
from $12 million to $50 million.
35
Argument and Brief of Appellee, Alcorn v Mitchell, 65 Ill. 553 (1872) (Supreme Court Docket No. 88,
Agenda No. 15).
36
Murphy, “Forgiveness and resentment” (note 33) at 25.
33
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That vulnerability makes messages of the sort Alcorn’s spit sent threatening, and the
threat lingers if we do not respond to them. Here’s how Pamela Hieronymi puts it:
I suggest that a past wrong against you, standing in your history without apology,
atonement, retribution, punishment, restitution, condemnation, or anything else that
might recognize it as a wrong, makes a claim. It says, in effect, that you can be treated
this way, and that such treatment is acceptable.37

To be clear, the threat that Hieronymi means to highlight is not that you might be
subjected to the same treatment again, though that may be a worry if people come to
think it is acceptable to treat you that way. Rather, the threat is to your social standing,
which is diminished if people think it was okay to treat you that way, even if it is not
likely to happen again.38
The simplest way to recognize a wrong is to resent it, and many philosophers have
thought resentment vital to self-respect. Heironymi argues that resentment is warranted when you hold three judgments:
(1) The act in question was wrong; it was a serious offense, worthy of moral attention. (2)
The wrongdoer is a legitimate member of the moral community who can be expected not
to do such things. As such, she is someone who can be held responsible and she is worth
being upset by. (3) You, as the wronged, ought not be wronged. This sort of treatment
stands as an offense to your person.39

If Mitchell had been able to deny any of these propositions, he would have had no need
for resentment. If, for example, he thought that Alcorn was not worth being upset by,
he could simply dismiss him. But Mitchell probably thought that Alcorn mattered, and
given the crowd’s reaction, he surely knew that other people did. In those circumstances, if Mitchell could not even muster so much as resentment in protest of Alcorn’s
spit, then he would seem to concede that he may be spit upon, at least by the likes of
Alcorn.
But though resentment would have been a way for Mitchell to resist the thought that
he may be spit upon, it would not have been, by itself, a terribly effective way of
countering the threat to his social standing. Hence, Hieronymi’s list: apology, atonement, retribution, punishment, restitution, and condemnation. To different degrees,
these are all public performances that would mark Alcorn’s behavior as wrong, and
thus stand as a counterweight to the message that his spit sent. Revenge does not make
Hieronymi’s list, but she later adds that “taking revenge might be one way to ‘correct’
the historical signiﬁcance of the event, marking it as a wrong.”40
I think that is right, and I do not see any reason for the scare quotes. Had Mitchell
done as the crowd demanded and killed Alcorn, he would have sent the message that
Pamela Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,” 62(3) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 529 (2001), 546.
38
Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” (note 37) at 548, n. 31.
39
Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” (note 37) at 530.
40
Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” (note 37) at 548.
37
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he may not be spit upon, that he regards it is an offense to his person, which he takes
seriously and will not tolerate. Of course, killing Alcorn seems much too much, as it
suggests that the wrong was much graver than it in fact was. There were surely
responses short of death that would have countered the message in Alcorn’s spit.
Indeed, there’s a certain genius in the law of the talion, with its famous formula an eye
for an eye. When a victim treats a wrongdoer just the way the wrongdoer treated her,
she communicates that she was wronged and will not stand for it. But she also claims a
kind of equality—an entitlement to treat others as they treat her.
That equality is central to the way that revenge works, or at least it was for adherents
of the talion. For them, getting justice was about getting even. But the evenness
involved was not about allocation, as the Aristotelian conception of corrective justice
would have it. Rather, it was an evenness in a certain kind of social standing, expressed
in a formula that inverts the golden rule: you may do unto others as they do unto you.
Much modern commentary about revenge misses this. The mistake is on display in
Robert Nozick’s suggestion that “[r]etribution sets an internal limit to the amount of
punishment, according to the seriousness of the wrong, whereas revenge internally
need set no limit to what is inﬂicted.”41 There’s a logic to the talion, and the logic is
largely about limits; getting even is not going postal.42
To be sure, most revenge cultures left some play in the joints. The rules were not so
rigid as to require that the victim do to the wrongdoer just what the wrongdoer did to
her. But it better be possible to sell the response as a way of getting even, or it would
not be seen as a justiﬁed act of revenge.43 And that leads me to doubt that Mitchell
would have killed Alcorn over the spit, or that he would have been treated well had he
done so. It also leaves me a little suspicious of his claim that the crowd demanded it.
But it might have: Alcorn’s spit presumably posed a threat to many in the crowd (if it
was okay for Alcorn to spit on Mitchell, it might be okay for him to spit on them too),
and in the heat of the moment crowds often take things too far.
Whatever the crowd demanded, we are now in a position to appreciate at least one
thing that Mitchell would have gotten from taking revenge. He would have countered
Alcorn’s message about his social standing. And if his revenge was properly calibrated,
he would have asserted, in at least one fundamental sense, that he was Alcorn’s equal.
That strikes me as a kind of justice, and indeed corrective justice. But what corrective
justice so construed corrects is the historical signiﬁcance of the wrong—the threat that
it poses—and not an aberration in the prevailing allocation of goods.
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Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (note 18) at 367.
William Ian Miller, Eye for an Eye (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 24 (“[W]e think of
revenge as going postal and blasting away, but revenge cultures did not think of it that way. For them, revenge
was not just an ethic but an aesthetic, the aesthetic of proportion and balance.”).
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I explore getting even in more detail in Hershovitz, “Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists” (note
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performance depends in part on prevailing assessments of value.
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IV. The Message in the Money
What did Mitchell get from his tort suit? Money, of course. But the suggestion I want
to make is that the money was paid in service of a message that is much the same as the
message Mitchell would have sent by taking revenge. In ﬁnding Alcorn liable for
battery, the jury marked his conduct as wrong, rebutting any suggestion that it was
permissible for him to spit on Mitchell. And this was not just a pro forma prelude to
the damage award. Quite the contrary. The message seems to have been just what
Mitchell was after when he ﬁled suit. In settlement negotiations, Mitchell told Alcorn
that “all he wanted” was for “Alcorn to acknowledge that he’d done wrong.”44 Indeed,
he disclaimed any interest in Alcorn’s money, explaining that he ﬁled suit only after his
attorney, among others, told him that he “ought not to stand it to be spit on.”45 So it
seems apt to say that the lawsuit was Mitchell’s way of standing up for himself.
Of course, the jury did not just ﬁnd Alcorn liable; it imposed $2,000 in vindictive
damages (the trial court reduced the award to $1,000 for reasons that are not clear
from the record). Why damages, and why such a substantial sum? For the same reason
that Alcorn spit on Mitchell. He could have hurled insults at him, but his spit showed a
contempt that words could hardly communicate. (As the old saying goes, actions
speak louder than words.) The jury was in much the same position. It could have
simply said that Alcorn had wronged Mitchell, entering a nominal damage award, if
that was formally required. By attaching substantial damages to its verdict, the jury
made its message unmistakable: Alcorn’s conduct was wrong, and seriously so. That
message still comes through loud and clear today. My students are routinely shocked
at how seriously the jury took Alcorn’s spit, as none of them can imagine being
ordered to pay $20,000, let alone $250,000, for a similar transgression today.
This is not the story that corrective justice theorists commonly tell about punitive
damages. They tend to argue that punitive damages are surreptitiously compensatory,
so that they ﬁt into the Aristotelian picture, or that they are out of place, since a
plaintiff does not have a claim to the money (or anything equivalent) prior to the
wrong.46 But punitive damages can clearly contribute to corrective justice if one takes
on board the suggestion that corrective justice is about correcting the message that

44
Testimony of J.B. Gillaspie, 3. Alcorn did eventually apologize. According to Gillaspie, he acknowledged
that “it was a little thing to spit on any man.” He also said it was “no credit to him” that he had done so, that it
was “wrong” and that he was “sorry.” Nevertheless, the case did not settle. Some witnesses suggested that
attorneys’ fees held up the settlement; Alcorn offered to pay $25 toward attorneys’ fees, but Mitchell’s attorneys
likely stood to do much better than that with a contingency fee. However, there are reasons to doubt that the
attorney stood in the way. One witness reported that Mitchell’s lawyer told him that he “could do as he pleased
about settling,” but that “he would not let any man spit in his face for ten thousand dollars.” Testimony of
A.J. Douherty, Records from Marion County Proceedings, 3, Alcorn v Mitchell, 65 Ill. 553 (1872) (Supreme
Court Docket No. 88, Agenda No. 15). I think it is possible that Mitchell used his attorney as a convenient
excuse. Apologies are easy to fake, and by the time Mitchell ﬁled suit, he may well have come to prefer public
vindication to an apology offered only as an inducement to settle.
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wrongdoing sends, not about altering allocations in an effort to restore the status quo
ante. Punitive damages help mark the gravity of a wrong. And because juries are
permitted to consider the defendant’s wealth when imposing them, they can ensure
that the victim’s dignity will not be seen as something available for purchase (at least
not without a price that is painful).
But what should we think, then, about compensatory damages, which often do seem
like an effort to restore the status quo ante, or at least aspects of it? They serve a
communicative purpose too. Once again, here is Hieronymi:
[A]ny wrongdoing leaves in its wake some amount of damage or cost, be it physical,
ﬁnancial, emotional, relational, or social. This is damage which the offender usually cannot
repair (“you can’t take it back,” as children learn), and which the offended will, in any case,
incur. The persistence of the damage threatens any attempt to leave the past in the past,
insofar as the damage testiﬁes to the deed.47

Hieronymi is refreshingly upfront about the problem that corrective justice theorists tend
to gloss over: a victim almost always suffers damage that cannot be repaired. Hieronymi
argues that when a victim forgives a wrongdoer she agrees to bear that damage without
further protest.48 And that strikes me as right. But her observation can also help us
explain why we might require a wrongdoer to undo the damage, or mitigate its costs
when he can. So long as the damage persists, it “testiﬁes to the deed,” and leaves the threat
to the victim’s social standing in place: it just might be okay to treat her that way, because
she was treated that way, and she has been left to absorb the consequences, even though
they might have been repaired. When we require repair, we afﬁrm the message that the
conduct in question was wrong and the results the wrongdoer’s responsibility.
The same observation can also help explain why we invite juries to award compensation for injuries that cannot be repaired, or even sensibly valued in monetary terms.
Pain and suffering damages, for example, do not ﬁx pain and suffering. And there is
typically no price at which people would agree to endure serious pain and suffering, so
the damages cannot be set to simulate a market rate. But pain and suffering damages
still serve a purpose: they mark the pain and suffering as the responsibility of the
defendant. To do that effectively, their magnitude must reﬂect the weight of the injury
that the plaintiff must bear. Thus, serious suffering merits a serious sum, even though
the serious sum cannot be taken seriously as a price or means of repair.
The bottom line is that tort law does not do corrective justice only, or even
primarily, by enforcing moral duties of repair. It does, to be sure, enforce duties of
repair. But not all tort damages are reparative, and they are no less a part of corrective
justice for that. Moreover, the damages that are reparative do corrective justice in the
same way that the non-reparative damages do. They do justice through the message
that they send about the victim’s standing and the wrongdoer’s responsibility.49
Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” (note 37) at 550.
Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness” (note 37) at 551.
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Stephen Smith gestures toward a similar view of the relationship between tort damages and corrective
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V. Tort or Revenge?
The lesson so far is that, in at least one important respect, tort offered Mitchell the
same thing that revenge did. It offered him a way of countering the message that
Alcorn’s spit sent, a way of correcting the historical signiﬁcance of Alcorn’s wrong.
Tort law did not just pay off Mitchell to purchase public tranquility; it saved him the
necessity of resort to private violence by offering him a civil means to do what he
might have done through force. This is the chief reason tort and revenge are substitutes: they can both be used to do corrective justice.
Which is the better way to do it? Tort has one obvious advantage. It is civil rather
than violent, and to the extent we can, it seems better to correct the historical
signiﬁcance of wrongs without inﬂicting further injuries. This is true for many reasons.
Justice is just one virtue among others. We should also aim to treat people humanely.
Sometimes that might require that we accept less justice, or forego it altogether. But it
might just require that we do justice differently, accepting civil means of redress when
they provide a suitable substitute for revenge.
Tort has another important advantage too: when a tort suit is successful, representatives of the community hold the wrongdoer responsible. That public vindication
may abate the threat that wrongdoing poses to its victim more effectively than any
action the victim might take on her own. As Murphy says, “our self-respect is social,”50
and because of that, victims have special reason to prize the communal afﬁrmation
reﬂected in a tort judgment.
But we should be careful not to overestimate the difference between tort and revenge
on this point. Revenge is rarely just a private performance. Recall that the crowd
demanded that Mitchell take revenge. That provided some communal afﬁrmation
even before he ﬁled his tort suit. And that sort of thing was not uncommon. Representatives of the community often played a role in revenge, sometimes by taking sides in the
dispute, and sometimes by judging what it would take to get victim and wrongdoer even.
Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that we can view tort as the institutionalization of the
oddman, a character who was often available in revenge cultures to weigh in on what
would get the parties even when they could not reach an agreement on their own.51 So
when it comes to public vindication, the difference may be in degree, not kind.
But elsewhere, revenge has clear advantages over tort. A victim can take revenge on
her own, and if she needs help, she can get it from family or friends. She does not need
to invoke complicated legal proceedings or hire a lawyer to help her navigate them.

corrective justice or tort. Smith comes at the problem from a different angle, and I am not sure that I agree with
everything he says along the way. But I do think he is gesturing in the right direction, and I hope here to have
explained why.
Murphy, “Forgiveness and resentment”(note 33) at 25.
Hershovitz, “Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists” (note 26) at 124–5. For more on oddmen,
see Miller, Eye for an Eye (note 42) at 9–11.
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And there may be special value in vindicating one’s worth oneself (you would rather be
the kid who can handle things on her own than the one who has to appeal to the
teacher for help). But I think the most important advantage revenge has is that it can
send a wider array of messages than tort. Tort has limited tools—money damages, and
occasionally injunctions. Sometimes, that will be enough. But in cases that involve
serious wrongdoing, those remedies will not be able to send a very satisfying message.
Ordering a rapist to pay medical expenses, for example, or even punitive damages,
does not really get at the gravity of the wrong. Here you can see the beginnings of an
argument for the fearsome consequences that criminal law imposes. I will return to
those shortly. The point for now is that in the most extreme cases, revenge can deliver
more complete corrective justice than tort law can. At the limit, there is always death,
and ever more gruesome ways of dispensing it. And that makes the range of messages
available almost limitless.52
There is more to say, on behalf of both tort and revenge, but I will stop for now.
There is no chance that we will replace tort with a regime of revenge, and I do not
think that we should. But we should remember that revenge has virtues that tort
cannot match.

VI. Corrective Justice and Criminal Law
Though the relationship between tort and criminal law is too large a topic to take on
here, I want to say a few words about how criminal law ﬁts into the picture. A standard
way of carving legal institutions assigns tort the aim of corrective justice and criminal
law the aim of retributive justice. This is much too neat. As I just suggested, when the
tools available to tort law are not up to the task, it is natural to look to the criminal law
to correct the historical signiﬁcance of wrongdoing. Sometimes, this may be because
the tort remedies are in themselves unsatisfying. Other times, it may be because the
wrongdoer is judgment proof, and hence immune to the main tool tort uses to send its
messages. In both cases, criminal punishment might do what tort cannot: afﬁrm the
victim’s standing by responding to the wrongdoing in a way that conveys its gravity.
Of course, this is not all criminal law does, and when it does this, it does it indirectly.
In a tort suit, a plaintiff ﬁles a complaint against a person she believes wronged her,
and the point of the process is to decide whether that plaintiff was wronged and what
should be done about it if she was. The person who would be a plaintiff in a tort suit is
typically a bit player in criminal proceedings. If she has a role at all, she is there to offer
evidence, not make a claim of her own. Victim impact statements and criminal
restitution orders blur this line a bit. But in the main, criminal proceedings are
about the defendant, and not the claims that a victim might have on the defendant.

52
Almost, but not quite. History has given us more than a few monsters against whom no revenge would be
satisfying.
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There may be a distinctive sort of justice pursued through criminal law. Certainly,
many people think that criminal law deals in retributive justice, which they take to be
concerned with the question how a wrongdoer deserves to be treated, quite apart from
the question what the wrongdoer might owe his victim. I am not sure that there is a
distinct kind of justice here, but if there is, I am quite certain that criminal proceedings
can do corrective justice too—and not just when restitution orders are tacked on.
Outside the courtroom, we ﬁnd it natural to think that criminal punishment delivers
justice for the victims of a crime. That thought is hard to square with standard notions of
retributive justice, which is not normally taken to be personal in that way.53 But it is easy
to understand on a communicative picture of corrective justice. Punishing a defendant
for a wrong that had a victim helps abate the threat to the victim’s social standing by
afﬁrming that she was mistreated and by marking the gravity of that mistreatment. By
the same token, declining to prosecute crimes that have victims risks leaving the threat
in place, and perhaps reinforcing it, especially where there are no other public proceedings that mark the conduct as wrong. There are good reasons not to give victims the
same control over criminal proceedings that they have over civil proceedings, as there is
more at stake in a criminal trial than corrective justice.54 But victims are stakeholders in
the criminal process because corrective justice is among the things at stake.

VII. Conclusion
I want to close in a courtroom several hundred miles from the one in which Alcorn
spit on Mitchell, with a suit that was ﬁled more than a hundred years later. The
plaintiff was an anti-smoking advocate named Ahron Leichtman. He was a guest on
Bill Cunningham’s radio show, invited to discuss the dangers of secondary smoke.
According to Leichtman’s complaint, another host at the station, Andy Furman,
repeatedly blew cigar smoke in Leichtman’s face during the interview. Cunningham
egged him on. Leichtman sued Cunningham, Furman, and the radio station for
battery. The trial court dismissed the claim, but the Ohio Court of Appeals revived it.55
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the ground that revenge is personal, whereas retribution is not).
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The court’s opinion is short, and the lion’s share of the discussion addresses the
elements of battery. The court concludes that the particulate matter in smoke can
make contact, and that blowing it in someone’s face is offensive. Thus, it holds that
Leichtman stated a valid battery claim and sends the case back to the trial court for
further proceedings. But not without comment. These passages appear near the end of
the opinion:
Arguably, trivial cases are responsible for an avalanche of lawsuits in the courts. They delay
cases that are important to individuals and corporations and that involve important social
issues. The result is justice denied to litigants and their counsel who must wait for their day
in court. . . .
This case emphasizes the need for some form of alternative dispute resolution operating
totally outside the court system as a means to provide an attentive ear to the parties and a
resolution of disputes in a nominal case. Some need a forum in which they can express
corrosive contempt for another without dragging their antagonist through the expense
inherent in a lawsuit.56

The contrast with the attitude of the Alcorn court could hardly be more stark. This too
was an act “done for the mere purpose of insult and indignity.”57 But the court does
not say that the law should afford liberal damages, or make an example out of Furman.
Instead, it calls the case “trivial” and “nominal,” and it suggests that Leichtman, not
Furman, needs a better outlet for his “corrosive contempt.”
There are, of course, reasons to think Furman’s wrong less signiﬁcant than Alcorn’s.
I would rather have smoke blown in my face than suffer Alcorn’s spit, and I suspect
I am not alone in that. We also take insults less seriously nowadays. And, of course, the
place where this one happened matters too. A radio studio is not a temple of justice.
Finally, it is tempting to say that Leichtman knew what he was getting into when he
went on the show. These were well-known shock jocks, and Leichtman had mixed it
up with them before.58 We must tread carefully here, however. We are talking about a
battery, and “he was asking for it” is just one letter off from “she was asking for it.” But
even if you think (mistakenly) that going to a place where you know you might be
mistreated mitigates the mistreatment, at best all these differences add up to reason to
limit Leichtman’s damages, not reason to bar his claim from court.
Unless, that is, you do not think Furman’s treatment of Leichtman mattered. And
that is the unmistakable message of the court’s parting comment. There are important
social issues to resolve (some of them presented by corporations!), and the affront to
Leichtman’s dignity is not one of them. Of course, there is the half-hearted suggestion
that Leichtman should have some other forum—totally outside the court system—
in which to express his corrosive contempt for Furman and friends. But kicking
56

57
Leichtman, 634 N.E.2d, at 700.
Alcorn, 63 Ill., at 554.
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Leichtman’s claim to kiddie court and casting him as the person whose behavior is
corrosive already downgrades his dignity. Sure, he was battered, but why bother
with that?
The court did not want to do corrective justice for Leichtman. It sent his case back
grudgingly, since it thought the Ohio Constitution required it. But in doing so, it
undermined the message that a verdict for Leichtman would send. I have some
sympathy for the court’s attitude. Leichtman was mistreated, but his suit may have
been motivated more by a desire to gain publicity than by the slight.59 (When the suit
settled, Leichtman got an hour of airtime to say as he pleased.)60 So Leichtman may
not have been a compelling candidate for corrective justice. But the court’s hostility
was not reserved for him; it took his case as representative of an avalanche of trivial
suits. And there is a lesson to learn from its screed. Tort is structured to do corrective
justice. But its capacity to do corrective justice is not just a function of its structure.
Justice is not just about who has what, and courts do not do justice just because they
move money around in response to wrongdoing. They do justice, when they do,
through the messages that they send about our relations to one another. So if we
care about corrective justice, we have to make sure that courts have the tools to send
the right messages, and that they care enough to use them.
This is all the more important in a society in which revenge is not a serious option.
Mitchell might well have killed Alcorn, or seriously injured him, but Leichtman was
not going to hurt Furman. We do not do that anymore, or at least most of us do not.
We are too civilized, or too timid. Or a bit of both. And it is not clear that it would
work anymore anyway. We are so steeped in anti-revenge discourse that we may not
hear the messages that revenge aims to send. But if revenge is not an option, then tort
better be, at least for any wrongdoing that we think worth taking seriously. Otherwise,
victims will not have revenge or an adequate substitute, and they will be left without
corrective justice.
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